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BROKEN SYSTEMS, BROKEN DUTIES: 
A NEW THEORY FOR SCHOOL  
FINANCE LITIGATION 
AARON Y. TANG* 
In May 2010, a coalition of California students, parents, and school 
districts filed a ground-breaking lawsuit alleging that the state’s public 
school finance system violates the California constitution.  The lawsuit, 
Robles-Wong v. California, is not ground-breaking because of its basic 
aim; at last count, school finance lawsuits with similar goals have 
occurred in forty-four states.  Instead, the lawsuit is path-breaking 
because of the novel approach plaintiffs used to frame their constitutional 
challenge.  Historically, plaintiffs have sued state governments using two 
legal theories: the equity theory and the adequacy theory.  Under the 
equity theory, plaintiffs argue that the states distribute school resources in 
a disparate manner that violates equal protection of the laws.  Under the 
adequacy theory, plaintiffs assert that the states deny children their right to 
an adequate level of education as guaranteed under the education clauses 
in state constitutions.  While litigants suing under the equity theory have 
lost more cases than they have won, adequacy challenges have met some 
success: plaintiffs in adequacy claims have prevailed in two-thirds of the 
thirty-three cases in state courts. 
In recent years, however, plaintiffs have grown less likely to prevail in 
their school finance challenges, losing six of eleven cases decided since 
2009.  Moreover, as I show in an empirical analysis of school spending 
levels in twenty-two states, even those states that have experienced 
successful adequacy and equity lawsuits continue to spend less than the 
amount necessary to provide their children with a quality education. 
Responding to these trends, the Robles-Wong plaintiffs allege a new 
and different form of constitutional violation: that the state’s school 
finance program violates the state’s constitutional duty to provide a 
“system” of common schools because it is not “intentionally, rationally, 
and demonstrably aligned” with the educational goals described in 
statewide academic content standards.  As this Article explains, this 
constitutional violation alleged in Robles-Wong, which I call the “broken 
system” cause of action, represents a significant evolution in the historic 
journey of school finance litigation.  In addition to describing the textual 
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and legal basis for this new theory, I argue that it builds on the 
experiences of its two predecessor theories, responds to important trends 
in education policy reform, and offers courts a manageable framework 
for ensuring that state school systems are in compliance with the 
substantive educational guarantees of state constitutions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
State public school systems throughout the country are failing to 
deliver the quality of education they have promised.  In New York 
State, one out of every three high school freshmen fails to graduate on 
time,1 a statistic that is difficult to reconcile with the New York 
Education Department’s pledge that “[e]veryone will graduate from 
high school ready for work, higher education, and citizenship.”2  Despite 
the California Department of Education’s declaration that “the public 
school system must meet the comprehensive learning needs of each 
student to reach high expectations,”3 only 22% of California eighth 
graders are able to read at a proficient or advanced level.4  Worse yet, 
for every California eighth grader who reads at an advanced level, there 
are nineteen eighth graders whose reading ability is below basic.5  As 
American students fall further behind international peers,6 and as poor7 
 
* J.D., Stanford Law School.  I thank Elizabeth Campbell for her constant support; 
Professor William S. Koski for his patient guidance; Professors Michael Rebell and Paul 
Tractenberg for their thoughtful suggestions and expertise; John Affeldt for spirited 
discussion that was vital to the development of this concept; and Ethan Hutt for his 
dependable insights. 
1. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT AND COMPLETION RATES IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2007, COMPENDIUM REPORT 21 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs 
2009/2009064.pdf.  
2. UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. & N.Y. STATE BD. OF REGENTS, STATE EDUC. DEPT., 
P-16 EDUCATION: A PLAN FOR ACTION 1 (2006), available at http://www.nfschools.net/ 
10561053110315997/lib/10561053110315997/P_16_Education_A_Plan_for_Action_2006.pdf 
(emphasis added).  
3. California Department of Education, Belief & Purpose, http://www.cde.ca.gov/eo/ 
mn/mv/ (last visited May 18, 2011).   
4. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE NATION’S REPORT CARD: READING 2007 
STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT: CALIFORNIA GRADE 8 PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2007), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/stt2007/2007497CA8.pdf.  
5. See id. 
6. In math, United States’ twelfth graders were outperformed by their counterparts in 
sixteen of twenty-one countries that participated in the Third International Math and Science 
Study.  NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PURSUING EXCELLENCE: 
A STUDY OF U.S. TWELFTH-GRADE MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE ACHIEVEMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 30 (1998), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/twelfth/.  In science, United 
States’ twelfth graders outperformed only five of twenty-one countries.  Id. at 36. 
7. In 2009, a child born into the highest quartile of families is ten times more likely to 
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and minority8 students continue to encounter devastatingly unequal 
educational opportunities and outcomes, it is at best a platitude—and at 
worst an understatement—to observe that state public school systems in 
America are broken. 
Although the end result of the failure of our public school systems is 
observable in dismal student outcomes, those failures begin with the 
dysfunctional structures that make up the systems themselves.  Nowhere 
is this dysfunction more obvious than in state school finance schemes, 
where the amount of money spent on any particular student’s education 
is often the irrational product of an inscrutable web of factors and not 
the result of a reasoned calculation of the cost to provide children with a 
quality education.  Indeed, in any given state, the amount of money 
spent on a child’s education is typically influenced by a dizzying array of 
input factors.  These factors include: three kinds of local property taxes, 
each subject to voter approval and state limitations; state tax programs 
and lotteries directed, to varying degrees, at school spending; state 
political negotiations over funding appropriation levels relative to state 
budgetary constraints; state foundation formulas that distribute agreed-
upon amounts of money based on daily attendance calculations in each 
district and various geographic and economic factors; state categorical 
programs that target money toward specific programs such as 
transportation, vocational education, professional development, school 
construction, and special education; and other considerations unique to 
the various states.9 
In California, for example, decisions about how much money school 
districts should receive and where that money should come from are 
made principally by the state legislature and governor as a result of 
Proposition 13, which was passed in 1978 to limit the rates at which local 
 
obtain a college degree by age twenty-four than a child born into the lowest quartile of 
families.  Family Income & Educational Attainment 1970 to 2009, 221 POSTSECONDARY 
EDUC. OPPORTUNITY 1, 2 (2010). 
8. 1999 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores showed that 
seventeen-year-old African-American and Latino students read and do math at roughly the 
same level as white thirteen-year-olds.  NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., TRENDS IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS: THREE DECADES OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE 
33, 35 (2000), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pubs/main1999/2000469.asp.  
9. For an overview of state-by-state school finance structures, see generally the NAT’L 
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 1998–99 (2001), http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/state_ 
financing.asp.  
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property taxes could increase.10  But to set a statewide education budget, 
school officials must follow the disjunctive three-part test enacted by 
voters in Proposition 98, where the particular test to be applied in any 
given year is often unknown until well after school funding is actually 
distributed,11 leading to severe unpredictability for students and school 
leaders.  Even after that amount is identified, it must still be divided up 
among districts in two parts: one part based on general purpose funds 
tied to “revenue limits” that are the historical byproduct of a 1972 
calculation, and a second part based on more than one hundred 
different categorical programs, each with its own rules.12  The California 
Department of Education itself concedes that “the system is 
extraordinarily complex and difficult to understand.”13  Stanford 
University Professor Michael Kirst concludes, “California’s K-12 
education finance system is broken in every way.  It has no underlying 
rationale, is incredibly complex, fails to deliver an equal or adequate 
education to all children and is a nonsensical historical accretion.”14 
California is not the only state where the school finance system has 
been widely denounced as broken.15  The recent economic downturn has 
underscored the erratic manner in which the vast majority of states set 
school funding levels, demonstrating that the driving forces behind those 
levels are political expediency, geography, and short-term economic 
realities.16  Only a handful of states have taken what would seem to be 
 
10. For a brief overview of Proposition 13 and its impact on school spending in 
California, see Education Data Partnership, Proposition 13: Property Tax Amendment 
(1978), (Mar. 2004), http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/articles/article.asp?title=Proposition%2013. 
11. See Legislative Analyst’s Office, Proposition 98 Requirement for Budget Year 
Uncertain, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2009/education/ed_anl09003002.aspx (last visited 
May 17, 2011).  
12. Michael Kirst, How to Fix California’s Schools: Today’s Method Outdated, 
Confusing, Inadequate, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 23, 2003.  
13. Education Data Partnership, A Guide to California’s School Finance System, (Apr. 
2011), http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/articles/article.asp?title=Guide%20to%20California%20 
School%20Finance%20System. 
14. Kirst, supra note 12.  
15. See, e.g., Alan J. Borsuk, MPS to Explore Dissolving District: Money Pressure Brings 
Board’s Surprising Vote, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1 (quoting Milwaukee 
superintendent announcing, “The state finance system to fund Milwaukee Public Schools is 
broken”); Deon Roberts, “Broken” Louisiana Public School System Awaits Leadership 
Infusion, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Apr. 25, 2005, at 77 (The local chamber of 
commerce president declared, “the [school] system is broken.”). 
16. See, e.g., Tim Martin, Deadline Nears for Michigan School Budget Cuts, MLIVE.COM, 
Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/11/deadline_nears_on_michigan_ 
sch.html.  
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the self-evident step of setting school funding levels based on the most 
sensible metric: the cost of actually providing a quality education to 
children.17 
This Article considers the role of state-level school finance litigation 
in solving the problem of arcane state school funding schemes that are 
neither rationally calculated to serve student needs in theory, nor 
actually serving those needs in reality.  In Part II of this Article, I 
describe the two legal theories traditionally asserted by plaintiffs in 
school finance lawsuits: the equity and adequacy theories.  Unlike the 
bulk of existing literature already written on the topic, however, the 
principle concern of this Article is not to advance an argument in favor 
of either of these theories.  I describe instead, in Part III, how recent 
developments in school reform—the rise of standards-based school 
reform and associated “costing-out studies” that calculate the cost of 
providing the education described in state standards—have changed the 
playing field for school finance litigants.  As a result, a new legal 
approach is necessary to align state education funding systems with the 
real costs of preparing our children for the challenges of the coming 
century.  In making the case for a new approach, Part III includes a brief 
empirical analysis of the impact of adequacy and equity litigation in the 
states thus far, concluding that despite the significant gains that the 
litigation has produced, a substantial gap still exists between what states 
actually spend on K–12 public education and what states ought to spend 
to meet their own academic content standards. 
In Part IV, I propose a new legal approach that has the potential to 
bridge this gap, the broken system theory of school finance litigation.  I 
explain the textual basis for the broken system theory, which is rooted in 
the text of various state constitutional education clauses, and I also 
examine relevant case law from state courts that have considered these 
clauses so far.  I then walk through a test case to demonstrate how this 
broken system claim could be litigated in Part V, using California as an 
example in light of the recent Robles-Wong filing.  Finally, I conclude 
 
17. See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 996–97, 1009–10 (N.J. 2009) 
(approving New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act, which ties state funding levels to the 
cost of providing children with an adequate education, to be in compliance with the state’s 
constitutional duty); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) 
(ordering the Wyoming legislature to adopt a school finance program that was based on the 
actual cost of providing children the quality of education promised by the state); Access 
Quality Education, A Costing Out Primer (June 1, 2006), http://www.schoolfunding.info/ 
resource_center/costingoutprimer.php3 [hereinafter A Costing Out Primer] (explaining 
costing-out studies, which estimate the actual cost of providing a certain level of education).   
12. TANG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:26 PM 
2011] BROKEN SYSTEMS, BROKEN DUTIES 1201 
with a brief discussion of some of the advantages and challenges of the 
broken system theory of school finance litigation. 
To preview the argument, this new cause of action is firmly rooted in 
language present in thirty-six state constitutions18 that imposes a duty on 
states to provide not just public schools in general, but a system of 
public schools.  I argue that, irrespective of whether a state constitution 
guarantees any minimally adequate level of education, the command to 
provide a system of schools requires a legislature to create an 
educational enterprise composed of programs and policies that are 
rationally designed to serve a common purpose.  State legislatures have 
made it clear that the common purpose to be served by their public 
school systems is the achievement of academic content standards.19  All 
fifty states have enacted such standards to serve as the foundation of 
their school systems, and most have passed additional laws expressly 
tying core school policies regarding testing and accountability, 
curriculum frameworks, teacher certification, and even textbooks to 
these standards.20  By connecting these programs to the standards in a 
calculated and rational manner, states have acted in significant 
furtherance of their constitutional duty to provide a system of public 
schools.  But they have failed in one crucial respect: school finance, 
which in most states remains wholly unconnected to the delivery of the 
standards.  A challenge based on a state’s constitutional duty to provide 
a system of schools would thus seek a court remedy requiring the state 
legislature to align its school funding structure to the actual cost of 
providing the level and quality of education described in a state’s 
academic content standards. 
 
18. Thirty-six state constitutions require the provision of a “system” of schools: ALA. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. 
X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. 
CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; 
MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; NEV. 
CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. 
art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; 
OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; S.C. CONST. 
art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; 
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1; and WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.   
19. See infra Part IV.B.  
20. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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II.  THE CURRENT APPROACH: EQUITY AND  
ADEQUACY SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS 
Under the conventional narrative, school finance litigation in 
America has proceeded in three “waves” covering two distinct theories 
of legal action.21  The first two waves together comprise the “equity 
theory” of school finance lawsuits, which is premised on the idea that 
inequitable distribution of school resources violates equal protection of 
the laws.22  The first wave asserted violations of the federal Equal 
Protection Clause and ended abruptly with the Supreme Court’s dual 
declaration in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
that education is not a fundamental right and that wealth is not a suspect 
class.23  The second wave commenced thereafter in state courts based on 
state equal protection guarantees, but was met with only partial success.  
Of the thirty-one state supreme courts to consider state equal protection 
challenges, only fourteen invalidated school finance systems.24 The 
conventional narrative follows that advocates then turned to a third 
wave of school finance litigation, the “adequacy” wave, distinguished by 
its focus not on equality of educational opportunity but rather on the 
state’s duty to provide some absolute, adequate level of education to 
all.25  What follows is an overview of the equity and adequacy theories, 
along with a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks inherent in each. 
 
21. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance 
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 598, 600–04 (1994).  
But see William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-examination 
of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1185, 1188 (2003) (noting how the so-called “waves” of school finance cases are actually 
not so distinct); James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1223, 1229, 1237 n.9 (2008) (arguing that the conventional story of “school finance 
litigation is not as neat as the traditional portrait suggests,” because even existing adequacy 
litigation has focused a great deal on cross-district disparities at the remedial stage). 
22. See Thro, supra note 21, at 600–02. 
23. 411 U.S. 1, 28, 40 (1973). 
24. Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of 
School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective & Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. 
L. REV. 543, 571 & n.124 (1998). 
25. Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation & Adequacy Studies, 27 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 69–70, 75–76 (2004). 
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A.  The Equity Theory 
At the beginning of the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court 
began to apply the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in a two-tiered fashion, a dichotomy that remains more or 
less intact to the present day.26  State laws that implicate “suspect 
classifications” or “fundamental interests” are subject to strict scrutiny, 
and are struck down absent a governmental showing that there is a 
compelling interest for the law and that the law is the most narrowly 
tailored way to achieve that interest.27  State action that does not touch 
upon suspect classifications or fundamental interests will be evaluated 
under rational basis review, where the state’s action will be upheld so 
long as the state possesses a legitimate interest and so long as its action 
is rationally related to that interest.28 
Advocates who sought to equalize the amount of educational 
resources devoted to low-income and minority children with the amount 
offered to their wealthier counterparts reacted to this judicial 
framework quickly, suing in both federal and state courts.  Their 
assertion was two-fold: first, they argued that education is a fundamental 
right under the Equal Protection Clause (or that wealth is a suspect 
classification) and second, that when subjected to strict scrutiny, 
unequal local property tax-based school funding schemes should be 
struck down for lack of a compelling governmental justification.29  As a 
result, advocates asserted, different districts within a state should not be 
able to spend wildly different amounts to educate their children.  
Plaintiff students in Rodriguez, for example, lived in Edgewood 
Independent School District where only $356 was spent on their 
education, compared with students in Alamo Heights School District 
which had an average annual per-pupil expenditure of $594.30 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Rodriguez plaintiffs’ 
argument that education is a fundamental interest and wealth a suspect 
 
26. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  Note the exception of 
gender-based discrimination, which is evaluated under an intermediate tier of scrutiny in 
between strict scrutiny and rationality review.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 524 (1996). 
27. See Gunther, supra note 26, at 21, 24. 
28. Id. at 35. 
29. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
30. Id. at 12, 13. 
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class, ending the first wave of school finance litigation under the federal 
Equal Protection Clause.31  Undeterred, school finance advocates 
renewed their claims under state equal protection provisions, given that 
state constitutions typically have their own variants of an equal 
protection clause that could give separate rise to a cause of action.32  But 
equity litigation met opposition in state courts as well, as a majority of 
the courts to hear such suits found for state defendants.33 
The equity theory has been undermined by four main problems.  
First, state courts, like the U.S. Supreme Court, have been reluctant to 
find education to be a “fundamental interest” for fear that doing so 
would lead to a slippery slope whereby any important governmental 
program would be subject to strict scrutiny for even the most benign 
differential treatment.34  Second, even if a court is willing to rule 
education a fundamental right, judges—and indeed the plaintiffs 
themselves—have struggled to define the proper meaning of “equity” in 
the school finance context.35  For instance, proponents of the equity 
theory in California’s Serrano litigation36 suggested a definition aimed at 
offering courts what they believed would be a judicially manageable 
standard: “fiscal neutrality,” or the concept that the revenues available 
to a school district should depend only on the wealth of the state as a 
whole and not on the property wealth of the individual district.37  But 
some advocates responded that disadvantaged children actually need 
additional resources to reach socially desirable levels of educational 
success—a kind of “vertical equity” that distributes resources according 
 
31. See id. at 40. 
32. ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE O. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 29 (2d ed. 2000). 
33. See Heise, supra note 24, at 571. 
34. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 37 (explaining that “the logical 
limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to perceive.  How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent 
food and shelter?”). 
35. See William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity 
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 594 (2006) (describing 
competing definitions of “equality” in school finance). 
36. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 940 (Cal. 1979) (noting defendants argument that 
“the trial court employed inappropriate criteria insofar as it focused on the notion of so called 
‘fiscal neutrality’”). 
37. See John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test 
for State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 319–21 (1969) (promoting the idea of 
“district power equalizing,” an approach that involves using back-end state level 
redistribution of school funding to ensure that school expenditures are not determined by 
district wealth). 
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to student needs.38  The problem with vertical equity, however, is not 
only that it is facially unequal in the first instance, but also that it is 
difficult to administer.  For once a court agrees to impose a remedy 
based upon vertical equity, upon what basis should it rely to authorize 
or limit how much more money a low-income school or student should 
receive than an affluent one? 
Equity lawsuits also encountered a third, related problem: even in 
states where plaintiffs prevailed on equity grounds, the political fallout 
was often severe among the states’ wealthiest residents who were no 
longer able to direct their local property tax payments to their local 
schools.  In California, for example, wealthy taxpayers responded to the 
state supreme court’s order in Serrano v. Priest39 to redistribute funding 
equitably among school districts by cutting statewide property tax 
rates,40 effectively reducing the quality of education provided to all 
children.41  Thus, the lesson from California is that even if school funding 
is equalized, the equity theory does nothing to prevent a state from 
“leveling down” school funding to some equally insufficient amount.42  
As the California Supreme Court itself recognized: 
 
What the Serrano court imposed as a California 
constitutional requirement is that there must be 
uniformity of treatment between the children of the 
various school districts in the State. . . . If such uniformity 
of treatment were to result in all children being provided 
a low-quality educational program, or even a clearly 
inadequate educational program, the California 
Constitution would be satisfied.43 
 
Lastly, equity litigation has been rejected in many courts in part out 
of a concern that education is itself a public policy matter over which 
legislatures, not courts, should be granted plenary authority.  As the 
 
38. Koski & Reich, supra note 35, at 610. 
39. 557 P.2d 929, 940, 958 (1976). 
40. William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607, 620–21 
(1996). 
41. JON SONSTELIE ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2000), available at http://www.ppic.org/ 
content/pubs/report/R_200JSR.pdf (concluding that California children are worse off after 
the Serrano plaintiffs victory). 
42. See Koski & Reich, supra note 35, at 591. 
43. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 943 n.28. 
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Supreme Court observed in Rodriguez, to find education a fundamental 
right would jeopardize separation of powers, usurping the “legislative 
role . . . for which the Court lacks both authority and competence.”44  At 
the heart of this critique of judicial involvement in equity litigation—a 
critique that has also been levied against adequacy lawsuits—is the idea 
that a state’s elected representatives are better suited than judges to 
make determinations as to desirable educational goals and resource 
distribution.45 
B.  The Adequacy Theory 
After losing on state equal protection grounds in many states, 
advocates turned to a different litigation theory: the adequacy theory.46  
Rather than relying on state equal protection clauses, the legal hook for 
adequacy lawsuits is the education clause present in state constitutions, 
which typically requires states to provide a system of public schools and 
often characterizes the required system as “thorough” and “efficient.”47  
The basic argument is that these clauses compel the state to do more 
than simply open up schools and demand student attendance; the state 
must actually ensure that some meaningful level of education is offered 
in the schools.  In practice today, adequacy claims are typically raised 
alongside equity arguments,48 and there are strong ties between the 
two.49  But adequacy claims have garnered greater success than equity 
claims, at least at the liability stage: of the thirty-two state courts to rule 
on adequacy arguments, twenty-one have found state funding schemes 
to violate their respective constitutions.50 
 
44. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973). 
45. Matt Brooker, Riding the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: Navigating 
Troubled Waters, 75 UMKC L. REV. 183, 222–23 (2006).     
46. The last equity lawsuits to prevail in state high courts occurred in 1994 in Arizona 
and North Dakota; since that time, successful school finance suits have come under the 
adequacy theory instead.  See Heise, supra note 24, at 579–85; see also Michael Heise, State 
Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 
TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1168–74 (1995) [hereinafter Heise, State Constitutions]. 
47. William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35 B.C. L. 
REV 569, 572–73 (1994). 
48. See, e.g., Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 520–22 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting both 
adequacy and equity challenges raised simultaneously by plaintiffs). 
49. See Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State Constitutional 
Imperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 750 (2009) (arguing “it would be a mistake to exaggerate 
the doctrinal differences between” equity and adequacy suits). 
50. See NATIONAL ACCESS NETWORK, EDUCATION ADEQUACY LIABILITY 
DECISIONS SINCE 1989 (2009), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/New_Charts/11_2009 
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The primary difference between equity and adequacy suits is notable 
in the remedy requested under each theory.  Unlike an equity lawsuit, 
which seeks a remedy that is relativistic in its nature, an adequacy 
lawsuit asks the state to provide all schools with some absolute, base 
level of resources sufficient to provide a constitutionally adequate 
education, however the court may define that level.51  A situation where 
wealthy school districts outspend their low-income counterparts thus 
does not necessarily violate a state’s duty under an adequacy lawsuit so 
long as the low-income schools have adequate educational resources as 
defined by the court. 
By seeking a court order declaring some absolute level of education 
that the state must offer and providing students and their schools the 
resources necessary to deliver it, adequacy litigants hoped to avoid 
many of the legal and practical problems associated with equity 
litigation.52  For instance, a court that finds for plaintiffs on adequacy 
grounds does not face the same fear that, in doing so, it may open up the 
door to spillover effects in other social programs because an adequacy 
ruling can be grounded in the unique text of a state constitution’s 
educational provision as opposed to some open-ended concept of 
fundamental interests under the Equal Protection Clause.53  Moreover, a 
court-ordered adequacy remedy does not need to define the thorny 
concept of “equality” with regard to school resources.54  And neither 
must it necessarily confront the same potential political backlash from 
wealthy taxpayers who often pay the biggest price in equity remedies as 
their tax dollars get redistributed to lower-income neighborhoods.55 
But even as the adequacy theory avoids some of the definitional 
problems associated with equity lawsuits, it faces a substantial, different 
definitional challenge.  Once a court reaches the merits of an adequacy 
claim, the court is asked to define that “adequate” level of education to 
which all children in a state are entitled in the first instance.56  
 
ed_ad_equacyliability.pdf. 
51. See Thro, supra note 21, at 602.  But see Ryan, supra note 21, at 1232 (arguing that 
remedies in adequacy litigation have not only been about absolute funding levels and have 
indeed considered relative funding disparities). 
52. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 46, at 1168. 
53. See Koski, supra note 21, at 1233. 
54. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 46, at 1169. 
55. See Koski, supra note 21, at 1233. 
56. See Ryan, supra note 20 at 1223 (“The basic approach of adequacy cases, at least in 
theory, is to define the outcomes that constitute an adequate education . . . .”). 
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Opponents of the adequacy theory contend that judges are poorly suited 
to create such a definition, particularly in comparison with legislative 
bodies that have the ability to conduct hearings and control the purse 
strings, and who are ultimately accountable to the people via the 
electoral process.57 
Acceding to this concern, several state courts have relied upon the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s political question doctrine to reject adequacy 
suits, ruling that their constitutional education clauses do not create 
judicially manageable standards absent an initial policy determination, 
which the separation of powers forbids.58  The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court expressed this view succinctly when it rejected the plaintiffs’ 
adequacy challenge in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, declaring that 
“[b]ecause the Legislature is endowed with virtually unreviewable 
discretion in this area, plaintiffs should seek their remedy in that forum 
rather than in the courts.”59 
Yet concerns over justiciability have not been persuasive to most of 
the courts where adequacy litigation has been brought.  In fact, only 
eight of the thirty-two states to consider adequacy challenges have 
refused to reach the merits of adequacy claims on account of 
justiciability.60  The vast majority of courts have rejected state 
defendants’ non-justiciability arguments, reasoning that to decline to 
address plaintiffs’ challenges would amount to an abdication of the 
court’s essential responsibility to interpret the meaning of the state 
constitution.61  The Arkansas Supreme Court explained its rationale for 
 
57. See Brooker, supra note 45, at 184 (arguing that courts should respect constitutional 
separation of powers principles by refusing to entertain school finance claims altogether).   
58. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (citing 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) (“To hold that the question of educational quality is 
subject to judicial determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a 
voice in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois.”); see also Bonner v. 
Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (concluding that the framers did not create a 
constitutional right to be educated to a certain standard and noting that the matter should be 
handled by the General Assembly, not the courts); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. 
Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 407–08 (Fla. 1996) (dismissing adequacy claim out of 
concern for separation of powers). 
59. 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995). 
60. The eight states are Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.  See MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS & KIDS: PURSUING 
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 22–29 (2009) (stating that seven of 
the eight states, excluding Indiana, had denied to reach the merits on the basis of 
justiciability).  After the time of the above publication, Indiana also denied relief on the basis 
that there did not exist a judicially manageable standard.  See Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 518.  
61. Michael Rebell offers a thorough account of the general view among state courts 
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reaching the merits of an adequacy lawsuit by declaring, “[t]his court’s 
refusal to review school funding under our state constitution would be a 
complete abrogation of our judicial responsibility and would work a 
severe disservice to the people of this state.”62  Indeed, some legal 
scholars have gone so far as to observe that the justiciability doctrine is 
itself inherently flawed for its failure to consider the judiciary’s proper 
role in our constitutional democracy.63 
Nevertheless, even though most state courts have shown a general 
willingness to consider adequacy challenges, history also demonstrates 
that once a court jumps into the adequacy thicket, its involvement may 
be protracted, difficult, and highly politicized.  In New Jersey, for 
instance, the landmark Abbott v. Burke line of cases spanned twenty-
four years and involved twenty discrete decisions by the state’s courts.64  
And although the Abbott cases have produced significant gains for 
school children,65 not every court to maintain its jurisdiction over a 
prolonged period is rewarded for its efforts.  In Ohio, the state’s high 
court issued four rulings over thirteen years, each affirming the right to 
an adequate education and demanding legislative compliance—but each 
order went unheeded by recalcitrant lawmakers.66  The power struggle 
between the Ohio Supreme Court and General Assembly was so intense 
that at different points the legislature proposed to strip the court of 
jurisdiction altogether, ignore the court’s orders outright, and even 
impeach justices who ruled with the majority.67  In the end, Ohio’s high 
 
that adequacy challenges are indeed justiciable in Courts & Kids: Pursuing Education Equity 
Through the State Courts.  See REBELL, supra, note 60, at 23–29.   
62. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484 
(Ark. 2002). 
63. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1031, 1059–60 (1984); see also Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The “Political Question 
Doctrine” and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1141–52 (1970). 
64. Education Law Center, Abbott v. Burke Decisions, http://www.edlawcenter.org/ 
ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/AbbottDecisions.htm (last visited May 18, 2011).  The Abbott 
cases concluded in May 2009 when the New Jersey Supreme Court terminated its prior 
remedial order in response to the New Jersey legislature’s weighted student funding formula.  
The decision was hailed by some as the long-overdue end of the Abbott legacy of cases.  See 
Brian Donahue, New Jersey Supreme Court Scraps Abbot v. Burke, NJ.COM, May 28, 2009, 
http://www.nj.com/ledgerlive/index.ssf/2009/05/new_jersey_supreme_court_scrap.html. 
65. For a discussion of the benefits from New Jersey’s Abbott cases, see LINDA 
DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD & EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S COMMITMENT 
TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 122–30 (2010).   
66. For a detailed explication of Ohio’s saga, see Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and 
Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 84 (2005). 
67. Id. at 85. 
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court threw up its hands and terminated jurisdiction despite finding an 
ongoing constitutional violation,68 with little educational progress to 
show for its efforts. 
The most recent scorecard for adequacy lawsuits suggests that, 
although the theory is still very much alive, success is far from a 
foregone conclusion.  Since 2009, six of the eleven states to issue 
decisions on adequacy litigation have ruled against the plaintiffs.69  
Perhaps the economic downturn has played a role in this development, 
or perhaps it is just a minor bump in the road and not indicative of any 
major trend.  But this much is for certain: measuring the success of 
school finance litigation by reference to only pro-plaintiff liability 
decisions is only a partial metric.  As plaintiffs’ experiences in Ohio and 
California demonstrate, persuading a court that a state has violated its 
constitutional duty to provide an adequate or equitable education is 
only the beginning of the battle.  The true outcome of the battle—
whether children are provided with the quality of educational 
opportunity that they need to prepare them for lasting social, civic, and 
economic success—depends upon the extent to which the remedy 
 
68. DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (2002). 
69. See Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. 2009) (ruling an adequacy challenge 
non-justiciable for lack of judicially manageable standards); Montoy v. Kansas, No. 92-032, 
slip op. (Kan. Feb. 12, 2010) (rejecting plaintiffs motion to reopen jurisdiction under its prior 
holding due to new statewide school funding system); Comm. for Educ. Equality v. State, 294 
S.W.3d 477, 489 (Mo. 2009) (finding that the adequate education owed under the Missouri 
constitution was limited to the constitution’s narrow guarantee that 25% of state revenue be 
directed towards schools); Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992–93 (N.J. 2009) (releasing the 
state from its duty to comply with prior court order of increased funding for so-called Abbott 
districts); Pendelton Sch. Dist. v. State, 200 P.3d 133, 141–42, 145 (Or. 2009) (concluding that 
the state had failed to fund its schools at a constitutionally sufficient level but refusing to issue 
a judicial order to compel the legislature to comply with its funding duty); Davis v. State, No. 
06-244, slip op. (S.D. Cir. Ct. 2009), http://lakeherman.org/coralhei/blogdocs/SchoolFunding 
RulingProposed2009.pdf(Circuit court opinion finding the right to an adequate education 
already fulfilled in South Dakota).  In the same time period, plaintiffs in five states 
experienced positive outcomes: Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 362, 376 (Colo. 2009) (finding 
plaintiffs’ adequacy claims justiciable and remanding to the lower court); Conn. Coal. for 
Justice in Educ. Funding v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 253 (Conn. 2010) (finding the Connecticut 
Constitution to guarantee children an adequate education defined by civic and economic 
preparedness); Citizens for Strong Sch. v. Florida Bd. of Educ., No. 09-CA-4534, at 6 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 2010) (rejecting the state’s motion to dismiss and holding justiciable the 
plaintiffs’ allegation that the state is denying school children their right to a “high quality 
education” as promised under a 1998 constitutional amendment); Olson v. Guindon, 771 
N.W.2d 318, 323–24 (S.D. 2009) (finding school district’s adequacy challenge justiciable but 
remanding for a decision on the merits); McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2, slip. op. at 57–
65 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010) (finding the state’s school finance system to be in violation 
of the state’s constitutional duty to provide an adequate education). 
12. TANG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:26 PM 
2011] BROKEN SYSTEMS, BROKEN DUTIES 1211 
ultimately enacted actually meets society’s ever-evolving educational 
demands.  It is to this issue that I turn my focus next. 
III.  THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO  
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
By most accounts, the past four decades of school finance litigation 
have produced demonstrable benefits for disadvantaged children.  The 
experience of students in New Jersey after the Abbott line of cases offers 
one positive example.  After the state supreme court’s 1997 ruling 
ordering a rough equalization of funding levels between the state’s 
neediest schools and the state’s wealthiest schools,70 New Jersey’s 
disadvantaged children made substantial gains in narrowing pre-existing 
academic achievement gaps.71  Progress of this sort does not appear to 
be limited to New Jersey.  One study of educational expenditure 
patterns across 10,000 school districts revealed, for instance, that court-
ordered remedies substantially diminished inequality among districts 
while increasing overall school spending.72  And though a handful of 
scholars argue that the additional funding secured by litigation has done 
little to improve student outcomes—that, in short, money doesn’t 
matter—this is an argument that many in the academic community have 
rejected.73 
 
70. See Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 421, 423 (N.J. 1997). 
71. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 65, at 122–30. 
72. See William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance Reform, 
in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 72, 75, 93 
(Helen F. Ladd et al. eds, 1999); see also Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform 
and the Distribution of Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 789–90 (1998) 
(studying sixteen states to conclude that “successful litigation reduced inequality by raising 
the spending in the poorest districts while leaving spending in the richest districts 
unchanged”). 
73. The argument that money does not matter for improving educational outcomes is 
most commonly associated with Eric Hanushek who suggested in his seminal article in 1986 
that school spending has little impact on student learning, and who has renewed that claim on 
numerous occasions since.  See Herbert J. Walberg, High-Poverty, High-Performance Schools, 
Districts, and States, in COURTING FAILURE: HOW SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS EXPLOIT 
JUDGES’ GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN 80, 94 (Erik A. Hanushek & 
Alfred A. Lindseth, eds.  2006).  See generally ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, 
SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-
ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009); Eric A. Hanushek, The 
Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1141 (1986).  For a thorough rebuttal of these arguments, see DARLING-
HAMMOND, supra note 65, at 99–130; REBELL, supra note 60, at 33–35.  See generally 
MICHAEL A. REBELL & JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI, THE CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, INC., 
OF COURSE MONEY MATTERS: WHY THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY NEVER ADDED 
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Knowing in broad terms that funding inequality has gone down 
while overall spending has gone up does not, however, tell us much 
about the extent to which school finance litigation has been truly 
successful, or even what constitutes “success” at any particular 
moment.74  After all, just what counts as a quality education—the 
ultimate goal of any school finance lawsuit—is a dynamic concept that 
changes over time as new economic realities and technological 
developments influence our society.75  The meaning of a quality 
education is also deeply influenced by political actors and policy changes 
in the education reform arena generally.76  Under any meaningful 
definition of success, therefore, school finance litigation must adapt and 
evolve with changing notions of educational quality to ensure that 
children have access to an education that will prepare them for the 
future.  Put another way, a school finance remedy that constitutes 
success today may be far from sufficient thirty years from now. 
Accordingly, the impact of equity and adequacy school finance 
litigation on today’s students should be evaluated in light of the 
dominant policy trend over the past two decades of school reform: the 
rise of the standards-based reform movement.  Unlike the school policy 
arena that existed when school finance litigation was in its early strides, 
the standards movement has created a present-day policy realm where 
states actually have defined the quality of education that students are 
expected to receive and schools are expected to impart.  The states have 
done so by adopting academic content standards, intended largely to 
define the skills and information that a state’s children “must know to 
succeed in the knowledge economy of the 21st century.”77  These 
standards have also been accompanied in many states by a new form of 
economic analysis, the costing-out study, which is designed to determine 
the cost of providing children with the quality of education promised 
under a state’s standards.78 
 
UP (2004), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/research/Money 
MattersFeb2004.pdf.  Conclusively resolving this argument goes beyond the scope of this 
Article, and so I proceed here under the presumption that money well spent can have a 
positive impact on student outcomes. 
74. For a discussion of possible definitions of success in school finance litigation, see 
REBELL, supra note 60, at 30–39. 
75. See id. at 35. 
76. See id. at 62. 
77. State of the Union Address, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 1 
PUBLIC PAPERS 111 (Feb. 4, 1997). 
78. See A Costing Out Primer, supra note 17. 
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Yet, as I show below, even in states where equity and adequacy 
lawsuits have resulted in plaintiffs’ liability victories, those victories have 
not produced the desired results.  Across the nation, statewide school 
expenditure levels overwhelmingly remain lower than the amounts that 
costing-out studies suggest are necessary to provide children with the 
education described in state standards.  It is this fundamental and 
persistent gap—between how much states actually spend and how much 
they ought to spend in accordance with their own standards—that 
creates the need for a new approach to school finance litigation.  Before 
turning to that gap, however, I provide a brief overview of the 
development of the standards-based reform movement as well as the 
costing-out studies that have accompanied the standards. 
A.  Standards-Based Reform and Costing-Out Analyses 
In broad strokes, the standards-based reform movement, an 
approach first articulated in the academic literature by Jennifer O’Day 
and Marshall Smith in the early 1990s, aims to improve educational 
outcomes by setting academic standards for what children should learn 
in school and by focusing educational programs on the attainment of 
those standards.79  Although a few states began to enact standards in a 
piecemeal fashion in the late 1980s, the 2001 federal No Child Left 
Behind Act brought the concept of standards-based reform to center 
stage by requiring all states, in exchange for federal funding, to set 
standards for what students should learn by grade level and to test 
students regularly to see whether those standards had been reached.80  
Although the annual testing requirement has been the cause of 
considerable consternation among many in the school reform 
community,81 and although numerous conservatives have decried the 
increased federal role in schools,82 the core concept of standards and 
accountability appears to be here to stay.83 
 
79. Jennifer A. O’Day & Marshall S. Smith, Systemic Reform and Educational 
Opportunity, in DESIGNING COHERENT EDUCATION POLICY: IMPROVING THE SYSTEM 250, 
251–52, 273–79 (Susan H. Fuhrman ed., 1993). 
80. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–8803 (2006); see also, Ryan, supra note 21, at 1227–28. 
81. See, e.g., DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 65, at 71–98. 
82. See, e.g., Neal McCluskey, End, Don’t Mend, No Child Left Behind, CATO 
INSTITUTE, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8712; Del Stover, 
Ravitch Decries Reformers Seeking to Divide, NSBA.ORG, Feb. 6, 2011, http://schoolboard 
news.nsba.org/category/nclb/. 
83. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Obama to Seek Sweeping Changes in “No Child’ Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A1 (noting proposed changes to the No Child Left Behind Act but 
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In drawing up statewide academic content standards, many states 
have sought to design rigorous and detailed grade-by-grade guidelines 
that capture the essential knowledge and skills that young people should 
be expected to learn and educators are expected to teach for students to 
succeed in their future careers.84  State lawmakers, in turn, have 
proceeded to use the standards as building blocks for other programs 
that make up the state school systems, tying testing and accountability, 
teacher certification, curriculum frameworks, and even textbook 
selection to the achievement of the standards.85  But not all states have 
been so demanding in setting standards; a number of school reform 
experts argue that quite a few states have actually established middling 
expectations for what their children should be expected to learn.86 
In response to this race to the bottom among state standards, a 
coalition of states, supported by the Obama administration, have set out 
to create a common core of academic standards that could be applied 
uniformly across states that choose to participate.87  This common core 
standards initiative aims to create standards “designed to be robust and 
relevant to the real world, reflecting the knowledge and skills that our 
young people need for success in college and careers.”88  The initiative’s 
considerable progress in the face of conservative opposition—at last 
count, no fewer than twenty-seven states have indicated their intent to 
adopt the national standards—signals just how entrenched standards-
based reform has become.89 
The continued development of state standards has also enabled 
 
that standards and accountability will remain its centerpiece, including a proposal to adopt 
voluntary national standards). 
84. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 60605(a)(2)(A) (West 2003).  The statute orders the 
State Board of Education to ensure that the state’s academic content standards are “based on 
the knowledge and skills that pupils will need in order to succeed in the information-based, 
global economy of the 21st century.”  Id. 
85. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
86. See CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., THOMAS B. FORDHAM FOUND., 2006: THE STATE 
OF STATE STANDARDS 9–12 (2006), available at http://www.thequestinstitute.com/curricdev/ 
docs/support/State%20of%20State%20Standards%202006%20FINAL.pdf; Paul E. Peterson 
& Frederick M. Hess, Few States Set World-Class Standards: In Fact, Most Render the Notion 
of Proficiency Meaningless, 8 EDUC. NEXT 70, 70, 72–73 (2008) available at, http://www.aei. 
org/docLib/20080527_FewStatesSet.pdf. 
87. See Common Core State Standards Initiative, http://www.corestandards.org (last 
visited May 18, 2011). 
88. See id. 
89. See Tamar Lewin, States Embrace Core Standards for the Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 
21, 2010, at A1.  
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researchers to produce estimates regarding the cost of providing the 
education that the standards describe.  More than two dozen states have 
commissioned costing-out studies for this purpose, occasionally in 
response to court orders.90  Although numerous methodological 
approaches exist for performing the studies, the two major ones have 
been the “professional judgment” and “successful school district” 
approaches, which consider the views of expert educators and the 
amounts spent in a state’s high-achieving schools respectively.91  Some 
commentators have criticized the role that costing-out studies have 
played in recent debates over school spending, arguing that the studies 
are too imprecise to deserve serious attention.92  But even to the extent 
that these criticisms may have merit, they counsel that policymakers 
bear in mind the limitations of costing-out studies, not that the studies 
should be disregarded altogether. 
In theory, the rise of statewide academic content standards, 
combined with empirical analyses of the cost of providing education in 
accordance with those standards, should have provided proponents of 
adequacy litigation with a neat and perhaps persuasive answer to that 
thorny question raised by the courts: what does it mean to provide an 
adequate education?93  Indeed, plaintiffs in many states suggested in 
some form that the courts should look to legislatively enacted content 
standards as a definition of educational adequacy.94  But in reality, even 
though several courts have considered state content standards to be 
relevant to their ultimate definitions of adequacy,95 only one state court 
 
90. For an overview of costing-out analyses see A Costing Out Primer, supra note 17.  
See also McDonald, supra note 25, at 79–90. 
91. A Costing Out Primer, supra note 17. 
92. See Robert Costrell et al., What Do Cost Functions Tell Us About the Cost of an 
Adequate Education?, 83 PEABODY J. EDUC. 198, 198, 199–200 (2008).  But see James W. 
Guthrie & Richard Rothstein, Enabling “Adequacy” to Achieve Reality: Translating 
Adequacy Into State School Finance Distribution Arrangements, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 
IN EDUCATION, supra note 72, at  228–46 (1999) (explaining the value that costing-out studies 
have in adequacy litigation). 
93. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political 
Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 349, 377–78 (1990) (suggesting that states standards should be used in school finance 
cases as a measure of what is a “minimally adequate education”). 
94. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003) 
(rejecting the argument raised by amici that the state’s regent learning standards should be 
used to define a “sound basic education”). 
95. See REBELL, supra note 60, at 62–64 (noting that “[a]t times, legislatively enacted 
state academic standards have strongly influenced, without fully determining, the content of 
the constitutional standards that were ultimately formulated by the state courts”). 
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has formally defined the adequate level of education owed to children 
under the state’s constitution explicitly in terms of the legislative 
standards.96  Most courts that have created definitions of educational 
adequacy have instead done so on their own, typically basing their 
definitions on comparative assessments of successful school districts 
within a state.97  But the bottom line, as Professor James Ryan observes, 
is that “[c]ourts have not yet taken advantage of the standards 
movement in school finance cases.”98 
The fact that the courts have not defined educational adequacy in 
terms of legislative standards would not be a problem for advocates and 
children if the judicially-fashioned definitions promised a higher quality 
of educational opportunity than the standards provided by state 
legislatures.  Unfortunately, that has not been the case.  To begin with, 
the eleven state courts that have ruled against plaintiffs in their 
adequacy cases99 and the eighteen states yet to hear adequacy challenges 
have, of course, not ordered any relief to children along any definition 
of educational adequacy.  Even in states where plaintiffs have prevailed, 
the courts have generally fashioned definitions of educational adequacy 
that, as a normative matter, fall beneath the quality of education state 
policymakers have otherwise enshrined in state standards.  For instance, 
many courts have described the nature of the state’s duty to provide an 
adequate education using relatively undemanding terms such as a 
“minimally adequate education”100 or a “sound basic education.”101  
 
96. See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 939–40 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam); see also Ryan, 
supra note 21, at 1233. 
97. See Ryan, supra note 21, at 1238 (observing that standards have not gained traction 
as a legal definition of educational adequacy because courts would have to fundamentally 
change their concept of school finance litigation from one concerned with comparability to 
one concerned with absolute resource distribution).  It should be noted, however, that the 
relationship has occasionally gone in the other direction; some state legislatures have 
considered judicial adequacy definitions in fashioning their own content standards in turn.  
The Kentucky legislature responded to the state supreme court’s definition of educational 
adequacy issued in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), by 
enacting the Kentucky Education Reform Act, which set for statewide learning goals largely 
based on the court’s decision.  See REBELL, supra note 60, at 60–62.  
98. Ryan, supra note 21, at 1233. 
99. See EDUCATION ADEQUACY LIABILITY DECISIONS, supra note 50. 
100. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540–41 (S.C. 1999). 
101. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 664–67 (N.Y. 1995); 
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255, 258 (N.C. 1997); see also Hornbeck v. Somerset County 
Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the state constitution’s 
“thorough and efficient” clause creates a legislative duty to provide the state’s youth with a 
“basic public school education”). 
12. TANG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:26 PM 
2011] BROKEN SYSTEMS, BROKEN DUTIES 1217 
Some courts have construed state education clauses to require such a 
minimal bar of adequacy that no relief is necessary at all.  In Texas, for 
example, the state’s high court ruled in 2005 that although the state 
constitution did impose a duty upon the state to guarantee students the 
right to an adequate education, the nature of that duty was so minimal 
that the state had already satisfied it.102  As the court noted, “[t]he public 
education system need not operate perfectly; it is adequate if districts 
are reasonably able to provide their students the access and opportunity 
the district court described.”103 
B.  An Empirical Analysis: What States Need to Spend vs.  
How Much They Actually Spend 
The proof that adequacy and equity victories have not increased 
educational resources sufficiently lies not just in the guarded definitions 
of adequacy that many courts have issued, but also in the empirical data.  
Put succinctly, school funding levels, both in states where plaintiffs have 
prevailed and in states where they have not, continue to fall beneath the 
amount that experts conclude is needed to offer children the education 
that the states’ own standards require.  To demonstrate this, I have 
compiled data in the table below from twenty-two states where costing-
out studies have been performed over the past decade.104  The table lists 
for each state the estimated per-pupil cost in 2008-adjusted dollars of 
providing a state’s children with the quality of education described in 
the state’s standards.  The table then compares those estimates against 
each state’s actual 2008 per-pupil spending amount.105  As the table 
 
102. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 762, 799 (Tex. 
2005). 
103. Id. at 787; see also Comm. for Educ. Equality v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 489 (Mo. 
2009) (holding that the state did have a duty to provide an adequate free public education, 
but that this duty was satisfied so long as the state abided by a provision in the state 
constitution requiring that no less than twenty-five percent of the state revenue be 
appropriated to public education). 
104. The data in the table is derived from two main sources.  For costing out estimates of 
the per-pupil spending levels needed to provide an education in line with state standards I 
drew on studies available on the National Access Network’s website.  See National Access 
Network, Costing Out: Fact Sheets, http://www.schoolfunding.info/policy/CostingOut/ 
factsheetslist.php3 (last visited May 18, 2011).  I then adjusted these estimates into 2008 
dollars using a Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator.  For the 
actual 2008 school spending data I relied on the Census Bureau’s June 2010 Public Education 
Finances report.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES 2008, at xiii 
(2010), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/school/08f33pub.pdf. 
105. Comparing the totals in 2008 dollars ensures that the analysis allows each state a 
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shows, in nineteen out of the twenty-two states analyzed, current 
spending is less than the amount necessary to provide children with an 

























Arizona Mixed 2002–2003 $7,628 $8,925 $7,608 yes 
Arkansas Yes 2000–2001 $7,461 $9,070 $8,541 yes 
California Yes 2003–2004 $9,912 $11,297 $9,863 yes 
Colorado No 2004–2005 $9,798 $10,801 $9,079 yes 
Connecticut Yes 2003–2004 $14,974 $17,066 $13,848 yes 
Hawaii No 2004–2005 $10,117 $11,153 $11,800 no 
Indiana No 2001–2002 $7,142 $8,547 $9,036 no 
Kansas Yes 2005–2006 $8,529 $9,721 $9,667 yes 
Kentucky Yes 2003–2004 $9,112 $10,385 $8,686 yes 
Maryland Yes 1999–2000 $10,390 $12,990 $12,966 yes 
Minnesota No 2004–2005 $11,008 $12,135 $10,140 yes 
Montana Yes 2006–2007 $12,646 $13,131 $9,666 yes 
Nevada No 2003–2004 $9,385 $10,696 $8,285 yes 
New Mexico Yes 2006–2007 $9,887 $10,266 $9,068 yes 
New York No 2003–2004 $15,910 $18,133 $17,173 yes 
North Dakota Yes 2001–2002 $8,814 $10,548 $9,675 yes 
Oregon No 1999–2000 $7,954 $9,944 $9,558 yes 
Pennsylvania No 2005–2006 $11,926 $12,736 $12,035 yes 
South Dakota No 2003–2004 $10,273 $11,708 $8,367 yes 
Texas Yes 2003–2004 $7,920 $9,027 $8,320 yes 
Washington Yes 2006–2007 $11,678 $12,126 $9,099 yes 
Wisconsin Yes 2006–2007 $9,820 $10,197 $13,840 no 
 
To be sure, estimates of how much it would cost to provide the 
education enshrined in a state’s own standards vary in quality depending 
on the rigor of the state costing-out studies themselves.  All of the 
estimates are also susceptible to the general critique that costing-out 
estimates carry some margin of error and should not be tied to a precise 
 
period of time to try to raise funding in accordance with the findings of their respective 
costing-out study.  
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dollar figure.  Accordingly, one meta-study that sought to produce an 
estimate of the overall national gap between actual spending and 
required spending under state standards did so in a range.  The study 
concluded that it would cost between twenty-four percent and forty-six 
percent more than states currently spend to provide children with an 
education in line with state standards.106 
The data in the table may also suffer from the critique raised by Eric 
Hanushek and others: that costing-out studies as a general matter tend 
to overestimate the cost of providing an education in line with state 
standards.107  But this bias, to the extent it exists, may be offset, at least 
in part, by the fact that the actual expenditure data used in the table 
comes from the 2007–2008 school year, and that school spending in the 
years since has been adversely affected by budget cuts resulting from the 
economic crisis.108 
In any event, the take-away point to be gleaned from the estimates 
and the above table is not the particular dollar amount by which any 
particular state is under-funding its schools,109 but rather whether the 
states are spending roughly what they need to be spending to provide 
children with the education that the states have defined as necessary to 
succeed in the twenty-first century.  And on this front the scorecard is 
quite stark; by and large, the states are failing to provide children with 
the educational resources they need.  That thirteen of the states in the 
above table have already experienced plaintiffs’ liability victories in 
school funding lawsuits—and that twelve of these states still show a 
funding shortfall110—underscores that equity and adequacy may have 
advanced the ball without yet reaching the endzone of educational 
opportunity.  The strength of this conclusion is all the more buttressed 
by the recent effort to develop a common core of rigorous academic 
standards to be applied across the states in line with the actual demands 
 
106. William J. Mathis, No Child Left Behind: Costs and Benefits, 84 PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN 679, 682 (2003). 
107. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Science Violated: Spending Projections and the “Costing 
Out” of an Adequate Education, in COURTING FAILURE, supra note 73, at 257, available at 
http://edpro.stanford.edu/hanushek/admin/pages/files/uploads/hanushek.pdf.  
108. See Alyson Klein, States’ Fiscal Outlook Is Still Gloomy: Report Finds More Cuts to 
Education Budgets Are Looming in 31 States, EDUC. WK., June 9, 2010, at 23, 23.  
109. See Costrell et al., supra note 92. 
110. To be fair, one of these states, Connecticut, experienced its plaintiffs’ liability 
decision in 2010, years after the costing-out study had been performed.  It remains to be seen 
whether the legislature will order a remedy that actually aligns state funding to the cost of 
delivering the state’s standards. 
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of the twenty-first century.111  If this effort succeeds, state school systems 
would require even greater resources to offer children the quality of 
education set out in the new, more demanding standards. 
At bottom, the need for an additional approach to school finance 
litigation thus encompasses two separate elements.  First, in states where 
adequacy and equity suits have already met some success, the rise of the 
standards movement and costing-out analysis shows that there is much 
more work to be done before all children have the opportunity to learn 
the knowledge and skills that the states have defined as necessary to 
ensure future civic, social, and economic success.  To the extent that a 
new school finance litigation theory can persuade the courts to go where 
they have preferred not to go under traditional adequacy claims—that 
is, to order their legislatures to provide sufficient resources consistent 
with these state standards and not some lower bar of educational 
adequacy—litigation can build on the gains that the earlier theories have 
staked so far.  Second, as a pragmatic matter, in states where plaintiffs 
have already lost challenges premised on the equity and adequacy 
theories, an additional legal theory is useful simply if it has a chance to 
succeed where the other theories have not.  I describe next how the 
broken system theory addresses both of these concerns. 
IV.  THE NEW APPROACH: THE BROKEN SYSTEM THEORY OF  
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
It is a commonplace observation among close observers of school 
finance litigation that the actual text of state constitutional education 
clauses is not predictive of litigation outcomes.112  Consider that out of 
all the fifty state constitutions, only two actually use the word adequate 
in describing the state’s educational duty: Florida and Georgia.113  
Strikingly, neither state is among the twenty-one that have agreed with 
plaintiffs that a state education clause imposes a duty on the legislature 
to provide an adequate education; Georgia’s high court rejected an 
adequacy suit in 1981 and the Florida Supreme Court did the same 
fifteen years later.114 
 
111. See sources cited supra notes 86–88. 
112. William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School 
Finance Litigation, 2 WEST’S EDUC. L.Q. 277, 280 (1993) (noting that “the distinctions 
between education clauses . . . have not made a difference in [the outcome of] school finance 
cases”). 
113. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
114. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 
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The absence of a systematic textual approach to evaluating the 
meaning of state constitutional education clauses in adequacy challenges 
has led some practitioners to go so far as to conclude that “disembodied 
parsing of constitutional terminology may be of limited or no value.”115  
One result of the weak textual basis for defining educational adequacy 
in state constitutions may be the reluctance that many courts have 
shown to create an ambitious definition of adequacy.  For in the general 
absence of clear constitutional text obligating the states to provide first-
rate educational opportunities to all children, many courts have ruled 
that the state’s educational duty is limited to meeting a “sound basic 
education” or “minimally adequate education” standard, rejecting 
plaintiffs’ requests to defer to the more robust adequacy concept 
embodied in state academic content standards.116 
In contrast to adequacy lawsuits, the broken system claim I describe 
here calls on courts to construe a specific term present in thirty-six state 
constitutions that has, as yet, not been the focus of claims rooted in 
education clauses—the term system.117  In doing so, the broken system 
theory offers courts a firm textual grounding that the existing litigation 
theories have yet to capture.  In addition, this theory places courts in a 
position to order state legislatures to align their school finance 
structures with the cost of providing the education set out in academic 
content standards as opposed to the lower standards that prior adequacy 
suits have typically engendered.  Construing the term system to reach 
this result is, however, far from a self-evident exercise, and so I take up 
the task presently. 
 
(Fla. 1996) (plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate . . . an appropriate standard for determining 
‘adequacy’ that would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers and 
responsibilities [of] the legislature”); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165–66 (Ga. 1981) 
(declaring that “it is primarily the legislative branch of government which must give content 
to the term ‘adequate’”). 
115. Paul L. Tractenberg, Education, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 293 n.137 (G. Alan Tarr & 
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006). 
116. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
117. See Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: Looking Backward and 
Forward Through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 411, 425–26 (2008) 
(suggesting that litigation relying on the meaning of “system” in state education clauses has 
been the “road less traveled” than reliance on adjectives such as “thorough” and “efficient”).    
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A.  The Plain-Text Meaning of “System” in State  
Constitutional Education Clauses 
 As a starting point, observe the difference between a typical state 
education provision that uses the term system and a provision that does 
not.  California’s education clause sets forth, “The Legislature shall 
provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be 
kept up and supported in each district . . . .”118  In contrast, fourteen state 
constitutions do not impose a requirement on the state to provide for a 
system of public schools.119  For example, Missouri’s education clause 
declares, “[T]he general assembly shall establish and maintain free 
public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state 
within ages not in excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law.”120 
What, if anything, should be made of the presence of the word 
system in California clauses where it is absent in Missouri’s provision?  
It would be a stretch, undoubtedly, to argue that the mere absence of 
the word system in some state constitutions automatically elevates the 
term where it is present to some paramount status immediately worthy 
of strict judicial enforcement; there are too many possible explanations 
for the term’s absence for such a simple accounting.121 
However, what is apparent is that where the term is used, it must 
carry some meaning.  The surplusage canon of constitutional 
interpretation, used two centuries ago in Marbury v. Madison, demands 
that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is 
intended to be without effect . . . .”122  The application of this rule is 
particularly sensible in the context of state education clauses given that 
 
118. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (emphasis added). 
119. The fourteen state constitutional provisions are  CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; GA. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; ME. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. ch. V, art. III, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MISS. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.H. CONST. 
art. LXXXIII; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; and WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
120. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (emphasis added).  Note that the distinction between 
“public” schools and “common” schools as used in the various state constitutions is a 
byproduct of the historical eras in which the respective documents were drafted and is of no 
moment to this analysis.  See generally, CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: 
COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1780–1860 (Eric Foner ed., 1983).  
121. Neither should this Article be understood as arguing that plaintiffs lack a colorable 
claim in the fourteen states that do not impose a state constitutional duty to provide for a 
system of public schools.  Such a claim may still exist, albeit in a weaker form that lacks the 
clear textual underpinnings present in the thirty-seven states that expressly create a system 
duty. 
122. 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).  
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these provisions were hotly debated, revised, and adopted at 
constitutional conventions wherein key elements of the respective 
clauses, including the system of common schools language, were subject 
to close scrutiny.123  As George Sands, a delegate to Maryland’s 1864 
constitutional convention insisted, “I want a public school system 
established, and I want here in my place to do my share towards making 
it absolutely impossible that the people of Maryland shall be deprived of 
it.”124  In fact, the use of the term system emerged in most state 
constitutions as an intentional product of the nineteenth century 
common schools movement, where lawmakers sought to 
constitutionalize the requirements for a system of common schools to 
make sure that opponents of public education could not backslide on 
the concept of universal, free public education in the future.125 
So what constitutional standard should a court apply in a broken 
system challenge—that is, what conditions must a legislature satisfy to 
meet its duty to provide a system of common schools?  There are three 
possible standards, each one associated with a different definition of 
system that a court could adopt: a weak definition, a strong definition, 
and a definition in between that I will refer to as the “rational–actual” 
definition. 
B.  The Weak Definition of System: Interconnected Constituent Parts 
State defendants will argue for a weak meaning of system and thus 
an undemanding duty.  To buttress their argument, the states may point 
to a dictionary wherein one definition of system is given as “a regularly 
interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole.”126  
A state defendant will argue that, under this definition, what makes an 
enterprise a system is simply interconnectedness among its constituent 
parts.  Because the state’s schools are all functionally interrelated by 
virtue of basic state policies governing curriculum frameworks, high 
school graduation requirements, school finance, and other programs, the 
 
123. For a detailed description of the history behind these clauses in state constitutions 
see generally John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence 
from the Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REV. 927 (2007). 
124. 1 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MARYLAND 1233 (1864) (emphasis added).   
125. For a thorough discussion of this historical development, see generally Michael A. 
Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New Path to Equity?, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK: 
RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 291(Janice Petrovich & 
Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005). 
126. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1269 (11th ed. 2003). 
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state will argue that it already meets its duty to provide not just common 
schools generally but an interconnected system of common schools. 
The problem with this definition is that it defies our ordinary 
understanding of what makes something a system.  Indeed, a second 
dictionary definition more accurately captures the ordinary meaning of 
system, particularly with respect to human-made structures and 
organizations such as schools.  That definition describes a system as “an 
organization forming a network [especially] for distributing something 
or serving a common purpose.”127 
An example may be helpful to illustrate why a system must be made 
up of interconnected parts that serve a “common purpose,” as opposed 
to just interconnected parts without some unifying goal.  If 
interconnectedness is all that is required, the United States highway 
system could be referred to as a “national hiking system” because it is 
interconnected in a manner such that a person could hike from Maine to 
California along it.  But to call our highways a national hiking system 
would flout the ordinary meaning of the word system.  The highways do 
make up a road system, however, because that is the common purpose 
for which they are designed. 
The state could respond, of course, that it already meets this 
interconnectedness, plus common-purpose definition because all of its 
schools are aimed at educating children and it has even enacted 
standards laying out a common purpose for its schools.  The problem 
with this argument, as I explore below, is that the ordinary meaning of 
system requires more than the mere proclamation of some common 
purpose unifying a system’s constituent parts; it also requires a means-
end relationship between those parts and the purpose to be served. 
1.  The Strong Definition of System: Interconnected Parts That Actually 
Accomplish the System’s Common Purpose 
If the meaning of system requires both interconnectedness among a 
system’s parts and some common purpose to be served by those parts, 
the logical follow-up question is what kind of relationship must exist 
between the system’s parts and purpose.  Put another way, is it enough 
for a system merely to announce a common purpose even if it is 
incapable of achieving it, or must the system be designed to achieve—or 
actually achieve—its purpose? 
An example will help to illustrate this point: the New York City 
 
127. Id. (emphasis added). 
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subway system.  Imagine that the New York City Transit Department is 
to start from scratch and design a new citywide subway system, 
completely demolishing the current one.  The transit department 
announces and makes public its new design—a state-of-the-art, clean, 
and efficient subway with the purpose of enabling New Yorkers to get 
from any place in the city to another in an expedient fashion.  But after 
the department builds the track, it has only enough money left to 
construct one station where passengers can get on and off trains.  As a 
result, passengers can get on the beautiful new subway at that one 
location and they can ride around beneath the city for however long 
they want—but they can disembark only right back at the same location 
where they started. 
Has the New York City Transit Department created a subway 
system?  Our intuition is to answer that it has not.  Under a second 
definition of system, call it the “strong” definition, our intuition may be 
guided by the sense that for a human-made structure to constitute a 
system the parts of the system must be (1) interconnected with (2) a 
common purpose, and (3) the system must actually achieve that common 
purpose.  The one-station subway satisfies the first two criteria but not 
the third because it completely fails to transport New Yorkers to their 
desired destinations, which, after all, is the purpose of any subway 
system. 
Drawing on this ambitious, strong definition of system, plaintiffs 
might argue that even though the state has created programs and 
policies governing its public schools that are interconnected in pursuit of 
a common purpose (the academic content standards),128 it fails to meet 
the third criterion of what makes up a system until students actually 
attain the standards.  Indeed, this outcome-oriented definition of system 
may be embedded in commonplace observations that the school system 
is broken, particularly where such comments are accompanied by 
statistical evidence of lagging student achievement.129 
A challenge predicated on the strong definition of system could 
request a court to hold unconstitutional any state school system where 
students are not actually achieving the standards set out by the state as 
 
128. For the present sake of argument, I assume that the purpose of a state’s public 
school system is the achievement of academic content standards.  I return to this question 
below, providing evidence of state legislatures’ intent to treat the standards as the 
overarching purpose for their public school systems.  See infra notes 164–65. 
129. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 15, at 77 (local chamber of commerce president 
declared, “the [school] system is broken”). 
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evidenced by test scores.130  Such a challenge could also request a court 
order to remedy the school funding system so that the standards may be 
achieved.  This argument may be most persuasive where state 
constitutions demand the provision of an efficient or thorough system of 
schools,131 because those terms connote some degree of actual success in 
achieving a goal.132 
Such an argument, although potentially far-reaching in its impact on 
the lowest-achieving students, comes with a major problem: a challenge 
predicated on the strong definition of system will surely encounter a 
response from state defendants that it demands judicial policymaking on 
a public policy issue for which manageable standards may be elusive at 
best.  That is, for a strong system challenge to succeed, plaintiffs must 
ask the court to determine a degree of student success relative to the 
standards that is enough to qualify a state’s schools as a system.  Does 
the state provide a system only once its educational programs have 
enabled a majority of its students to reach the standards?  When all of 
the students meet standards?  Or must there be only an opportunity for 
all students to meet the standards?  These vexing questions may well be 
of a nature best left to a democratically accountable legislature, and a 
judge may reject the strong definition accordingly.133 
 
130. It is important to note that a challenge under the strong definition of system would 
not be the same as an adequacy claim.  That is, that the thrust of the strong system challenge 
would not be that the standards constitute a definition of the adequate education owed under 
a state constitution, but rather that a state does not provide a system of public schools until its 
schools actually satisfy their purpose as set out by the legislature. 
131. Six states use both of the terms “thorough” and “efficient” to describe the system of 
schools to be provided.  See MD. CONST. art VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; N.J. 
CONST. art VIII, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONST. art III, § 14; and W. VA. CONST. 
art. XII, § 1.  Six more states use the term “efficient” alone in describing the system of schools 
to be provided, see ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.  Two states use the 
term “thorough” alone.  See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; and IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1.  
132. Note that under traditional adequacy arguments, the terms thorough and efficient 
have been interpreted as qualifying the minimum level of education that a state owes—not 
the kind of system that a state is constitutionally required to provide.  See Tractenberg, supra 
note 117, at 427 (describing how a potential claim in New Jersey arguing for a duty to create 
an “efficient system” of common schools could require the state to provide funding sufficient 
to ensure that students are actually meeting the outcomes required in state standards).   
133. But see supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text for the view that it might be 
inappropriate for judges to avoid this claim on justiciability grounds. 
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2.  The “Rational–Actual” Definition of System: Interconnectedness 
Among Parts of the System that Are Actually and Rationally Designed 
to Serve a Common Purpose 
 Where the weak definition says too little in considering any 
interconnected collection of objects to be a system even where they lack 
a common purpose, the strong definition says too much by requiring a 
system to actually achieve its common purpose.134  Situated in between is 
a third possible definition of system—a definition that is at once 
reasonable given the ordinary meaning of the word and suggestive of an 
appropriate and manageable judicial standard for adjudication.  This 
third definition is evident upon closer examination of the dictionary 
definition given above for human-made structures, that a system is “an 
organization forming a network especially for . . . serving a common 
purpose.”135  To constitute a system under this definition, the 
interconnected parts of an enterprise must simply be rationally designed 
with a particular goal in mind: serving, or making achievable, a common 
purpose. 
Restated, the third definition thus holds that an organization should 
be considered a system if its core parts are (1) interconnected with (2) a 
common purpose, and (3) the parts are rationally and actually designed 
to achieve that purpose.  This “rational-actual” definition recognizes 
that the parts of a system must be designed with the goal of achieving a 
common purpose, but also recognizes that the system as a whole may 
not always meet this purpose—the U.S. highway system is still a 
highway system despite periodic traffic delays.  In other words, the 
rational–actual definition contemplates a looser degree of means-end fit 
than the strong definition.  Where the strong definition demands that 
the system actually achieve its purpose, this third definition says that the 
system must be only reasonably designed to achieve it. 
Thus, despite its many flaws, the present-day New York City subway 
system is indeed a system if it is interconnected with a shared 
transportation purpose and if its core parts are rationally and actually 
designed to achieve that purpose.  Consistent with ordinary usage, we 
 
134. By analogy, the strong definition may overstate what is necessary for an enterprise 
to qualify as a system.  We consider a railroad system to be a system even if there are 
occasional delays and accidents on the tracks that prevent the system from always 
accomplishing its transportation purpose. 
135. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 126, at 1269 
(emphasis added). 
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still consider the NYC subway to be a system despite occasional service 
delays.  And what makes the hypothetical new one-stop-only subway 
above not a system under the rational–actual definition is not the fact 
that it fails wholesale to transport people but rather that a subway 
structure with miles and miles of track and only one station cannot be 
considered rationally designed to meet its purpose.  Similarly, we do not 
consider the U.S. highway system to be a “national hiking system” 
because it was not designed for the actual purpose of hiking. 
The rational–actual definition best captures the ordinary meaning of 
the term system in the education context.  When educators and 
policymakers observe that a school system is broken, the crux of their 
meaning is that the system is irrationally or not actually designed to 
accomplish its purpose.  Of course, if a core part of a school system—
such as school funding—is not designed so as to make state standards 
achievable, it should not surprise lawmakers when large numbers of 
students fail to meet those standards.  But what stops the state’s 
educational enterprise from being called a system in this scenario is the 
irrational way in which the state’s program is designed, not the fact that 
students have fallen short of the standards.136 
Using the rational–actual definition of system, plaintiffs can argue 
that the duty to provide a system of common schools requires the state 
to design educational programs in a manner that is rationally and 
actually calculated to achieve the shared purpose of the academic 
content standards.  The state will have to satisfy both prongs of the 
definition to show that it has fulfilled its duty.  First, for its educational 
programs to be rationally calculated to achieve academic standards, the 
state will have to demonstrate that its core educational programs have 
been designed in a manner that would reasonably further the 
achievement of state content standards.137  Most states have, it turns out, 
already tailored core educational programs such as school 
accountability, curriculum, teacher certification, and so on to the 
standards.138  Plaintiffs would simply request that states do the same for 
their school funding structures.  Second, for a challenged state policy to 
 
136. Whether or not students are achieving the standards according to statewide test 
scores may, however, factor into a judicial determination of whether a particular aspect of the 
state school system was rationally and actually designed for the purpose of achieving the 
state’s standards. 
137. See infra Part IV.C for a more detailed discussion of what it would mean for a state 
to have a rationally calculated school system. 
138. See infra note 160. 
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fulfill the “actually calculated” element of the rational–actual definition, 
the state policy must actually, or deliberately, be designed to serve state 
standards—an imaginary, ex-post justification will not do.139 
C.  How State Courts So Far Have Construed the Meaning of System 
It may be useful to pause for a moment and consider whether any of 
the definitions of system that I have posited here align with the manner 
in which state courts have construed the term in litigation thus far.  
Although the courts have given scant attention to the term system to 
date, the little analysis that does exist suggests that the rational–actual 
definition is consistent with what courts may be likely to think; that is, 
the courts that have discussed the meaning of system so far have 
recognized that a state school system must serve a common purpose and 
that the state’s educational programming must bear some reasonable, 
actual relationship to that purpose. 
Before turning to the decisions that have considered the meaning of 
the term system, however, it is important to appreciate how courts have 
tended to overlook the term in school finance litigation thus far.  
Professor Paul Tractenberg, a leading voice in school finance litigation 
over the past four decades, recently observed in the context of twenty-
plus years of litigation in the New Jersey Abbott line of cases that 
consideration of the meaning of the word system has been a part of the 
road less traveled in the long journey of school finance litigation to 
date.140  According to Tractenberg, New Jersey’s high court relied 
instead on the meaning of the word thorough, which modifies system in 
the state’s education clause.141  Idaho’s Supreme Court fashioned a 
definition of adequacy based largely upon the same term.142  Similarly, 
state high courts in Texas, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Arkansas have 
also found it unnecessary to define the term system in their respective 
school finance decisions.  Each of these courts has instead reached a 
pro-plaintiff liability ruling by focusing predominantly on a different 
term that modifies system in each state’s constitution—the word 
 
139. See infra Part IV.C for a more detailed discussion of what it would mean for a state 
to actually design its school finance system for the purpose of achieving state standards. 
140. See Tractenberg, supra note 117, at 412. 
141. Id. at 420; see also N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Legislature shall provide 
for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools 
. . . .”).  
142. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993) 
(focusing on the definition of thorough in the state constitution). 
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efficient.143 
Court decisions in three states, however, have given more than 
passing attention to the presence and meaning of the term system in 
state education clauses.  In Campbell County School District v. State, 
Wyoming’s school finance case, the state’s high court looked to a 
dictionary definition to understand the meaning of the state 
constitution’s guarantee of a “system of public instruction.”144 Notably, 
the court chose to rely upon a definition that is markedly similar to the 
one referenced above in my rational–actual definition of system: “a 
regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified 
whole; a group of artificial objects or an organization forming a network 
especially for distributing something or serving a common purpose.”145  
Indeed, the court construed the entire state education clause in a 
manner strikingly similar to that which plaintiffs in a broken system 
challenge might seek: 
 
[W]e can define “a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools adequate to the proper instruction of the 
state’s youth” as an organization forming a network for 
serving the common purpose of public schools which 
organization . . . is reasonably sufficient for the 
appropriate or suitable teaching/education/learning of the 
state’s school age children.146 
 
If state standards represent “suitable teaching/education/learning” 
for the state’s children,147 then it is easy to see how the Wyoming court’s 
description of the state’s system duty could represent precisely the 
holding that plaintiffs to a broken system challenge would want.  But 
because plaintiffs raised equity and adequacy challenges in Campbell 
 
143. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484 
(Ark. 2002); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211–13 (Ky. 1989); 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394–96 (Tex. 1989) Pauley v. Kelly, 255 
S.E.2d 859, 876 (W. Va. 1979). 
144. See 907 P.2d 1238, 1258 (Wyo. 1995); see also WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
145. Compare supra text accompanying note 135, with Campbell County Sch. Dist., 907 
P.2d at 1258 (emphasis added).  Note that the court also considered an 1889 definition of the 
term system that was more similar to the weak definition of system, but the court ultimately 
relied upon the contemporary “common purpose” definition in fashioning its description of 
the state’s duty.  Id. 
146. Id. at 1258–59 (emphasis added). 
147. See supra Part IV.B. 
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and not a broken system challenge, the court in that case did not 
consider whether this definition of system would necessitate a rational 
and actual connection between the state’s school finance system and 
state content standards. 
Like the Wyoming Supreme Court, New York courts have also 
interpreted the meaning of system in a fashion that evokes the rational–
actual definition.  Justice Hopkins first construed the term in his partial 
concurrence to the New York Appellate Division’s opinion in Levittown 
Union Free School District v. Nyquist, which found the state’s school 
finance structure to violate the state equal protection clause and the 
state’s education article.148  Agreeing with the majority opinion’s 
conclusion that the state’s school finance program violated the 
education article in the New York Constitution, Justice Hopkins wrote, 
“[t]he word ‘system’ has large implications . . . a system is a whole 
composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or 
plan.”149  Justice Hopkins also referred to an applicable “more 
specialized” definition: “A system is a group of components integrated to 
accomplish a purpose.”150  The state’s system of funding schools, 
however, in the justice’s view, had become a “patchwork mounted on 
patchwork, an Ossa of confusion piled on a Pelion of disorder.”151  In 
short, the state was in violation of its duty to provide a system of free 
common schools because its funding program was such a “maze of . . . 
convoluted intricacies” that its irrationality “negate[d] the existence of a 
basic Statewide fiscal system for education.”152 
Later, however, in a dissenting opinion from the state’s landmark 
1995 adequacy case Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, Judge Simons 
described the meaning of the state constitution’s system guarantee in an 
arguably less demanding manner than the rational–actual definition.153  
Describing the court’s prior holding in Levittown, Justice Simons 
observed, 
 
[T]he Levittown Court concluded that the system of 
which the Constitution speaks is a framework of 
 
148. 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
149. Id. at 873–74 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971)) (emphasis added). 
150. Id. at 874 n.7 (emphasis added). 
151. Id. at 875. 
152. Id. at 874. 
153. See 655 N.E.2d 661, 678 (N.Y. 1995) (Simons, J. dissenting). 
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educational programming and, implicitly, regulatory 
oversight of compliance with that framework. We 
concluded further that the State manifestly had 
“supported and maintained” the system because State 
appropriations for the New York public school system, 
judged by the fiscal contributions of other States, far 
exceeded those of all but two others. . . . In sum, we fully 
interpreted the Education Article, concluding that the 
State had met its constitutional obligation because it had 
created a system—it had defined a sound basic education 
and the facilities necessary to provide it . . . .154 
 
In other words, Judge Simons agreed that a system properly 
understood must evince some common purpose, which he found the 
state to have accomplished through its definition of a “sound basic 
education.”155  But rather than looking for evidence that the state’s 
school finance structure was deliberately and rationally designed to 
meet that common purpose, Judge Simons instead argued that the 
state’s system duty was fulfilled simply because New York spent more 
money on education than most other states.156  One wonders whether 
Judge Simons might have interpreted the state’s system guarantee to 
require a more rationally designed school finance formula if New York’s 
school expenditure levels had been lower and not greater than those of 
all but two states.  But, in any case, his views are expressed in only a 
dissenting opinion and thus would not be dispositive for a broken 
system claim raised in New York or elsewhere.157 
Finally, California’s own high court has considered the meaning of 
system in a manner consistent with the rational–actual definition.  First, 
in an 1893 decision, Kennedy v. Miller, the court observed, “The term 
‘system,’ itself, imports a unity of purpose, as well as an entirety of 
operation; and the direction to the legislature to provide ‘a’ system of 
common schools means one system, which shall be applicable to all the 
common schools within the state.”158  Later, in Piper v. Big Pine School 
District, the California Supreme Court elaborated on the state’s 
calculated, rational creation of a school system aimed at achieving a 
 
154. Id. at 678–79. 
155. See id. 
156. Id. at 679. 
157. Id. at 675–82. 
158. 32 P. 558, 559 (Cal. 1893) (emphasis added). 
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common purpose, stating, “The public school system of this state is a 
product of the studied thought of the eminent educators of this and other 
states of the Union, perfected by years of trial and experience.”159  
Kennedy and Piper are thus consistent with the proposition that the 
state’s educational programs must share a common purpose, and the 
state must affirmatively and studiously design the school system so as to 
achieve that purpose—it is not enough for the state to enact a mishmash 
of educational policies and programs that incidentally share some 
common goal.160 
With this language from the California Supreme Court in view, and 
also considering the persuasive force of the definitions of system given 
in Wyoming and New York, I turn now to a blueprint for how a broken 
system claim might be litigated in California. 
V.  A CALIFORNIA CASE STUDY FOR LITIGATING THE  
BROKEN SYSTEM CLAIM 
Litigating the broken system claim encompasses at least three 
essential challenges that plaintiffs will have to surmount.  First, plaintiffs 
must establish the scope of the duty created by the term system in their 
respective state constitutional education provisions.  Second, plaintiffs 
must show that the system duty extends to the state’s academic content 
standards; that is, that the common purpose to be served by the school 
system is the standards and not some lesser goal.  Third, plaintiffs must 
prove that the state has failed to meet its duty to provide a system of 
common schools as they have defined the duty in the first two steps.161  I 
walk through these challenges presently using California as an example 
in light of the recent Robles-Wong filing. 
 
159. Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist. of Inyo County, 226 P. 926, 930 (Cal. 1924) (emphasis 
added). 
160. The California courts did not depart from the Kennedy and Piper construction of 
the term system in the two school finance lawsuits that have taken place in California since: 
the Serrano equity decision and a more recent case, Williams v. State, No. 312236, slip op. 
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003).  In Serrano, the court did observe that it had never interpreted 
the phrase “system of common schools” to “require equal school spending,” but that is not 
material for the broken system theory since it does not demand equity in spending but rather 
a rational alignment with the state content standards.  Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248–
49 (Cal. 1971).   
161. Note that a fourth step will be necessary, though not terribly challenging: plaintiffs 
will have to show that California children have been harmed by the state’s violation of its 
duty to provide a system of common schools.  Ample evidence of the educational harm 
wrought by insufficient school funding is discussed, for example, in DARLING-HAMMOND, 
supra note 65, at 99–130. 
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A.  The State’s Duty to Provide a School System that is Rationally and 
Actually Designed to Achieve a Common Purpose 
The first step for plaintiffs litigating a broken system claim is to 
establish the scope of the duty as it is used in their state constitution.  As 
discussed above, the key legal question in this task concerns the 
meaning of the word system.  The State will argue for a weak definition, 
and plaintiffs must counter that the term’s meaning is more accurately 
captured in either of the two stronger definitions.  Between the two 
stronger definitions, the definition that best captures the ordinary 
meaning of system is the rational–actual definition, and that the State 
accordingly owes a duty to provide a school system that is made up of 
interconnected core educational programs that are rationally and 
actually designed to serve a common purpose.162  The Robles-Wong 
complaint chooses precisely this definition in describing the nature of 
California’s duty under the system of common schools clause where it 
asserts: 
 
Defendants have violated their constitutional duty to 
provide and support the “system of common schools” by 
failing to provide and sufficiently fund an education 
finance system that is intentionally, rationally, and 
demonstrably aligned with the goals and objectives of the 
State’s prescribed educational program and the costs of 
ensuring that all children of all needs have the 
opportunity to become proficient according to the State’s 
academic standards . . . .163 
 
To persuade the court to adopt this rational–actual definition of 
system, plaintiffs should rely on the textual arguments and analogies 
discussed above,164 and also on case law, both from the previously 
described California cases (Kennedy and Piper) as well as other state 
 
162. For substantive or even strategic reasons, plaintiffs could argue in the alternative 
for the strong definition of system which creates a more demanding state duty—a duty to 
actually ensure student success in meeting the school system’s common purpose.  See 
Tractenberg, supra note 117, at 427. 
163. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 53, Robles-Wong v. State, No. 
RG10515768 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2010) (emphasis added), available at http://fixschool 
finance.org/~/media/CSF/Files/ Complaint_052010.ashx.   
164. See supra Part III.A. 
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court decisions in New York and Wyoming as persuasive authorities.165 
B.  The Common Purpose of the State’s System of Common Schools: 
Achieving the State’s Academic Standards 
To secure a remedy ordering the State to align school funding with 
the actual cost of providing the quality of education described in state 
standards, plaintiffs must establish that the standards are indeed the 
common purpose that unifies the various elements of the State’s school 
system.  For if the common purpose that the system is designed to serve 
is something less than the standards—such as keeping kids off the 
streets or providing some minimally basic level of education—a court 
may well find that the State’s educational programs are already designed 
to serve that purpose in full compliance with its constitutional system 
duty. 
Fortunately for plaintiffs, the actions taken by state legislatures 
themselves confirm the achievement of academic content standards 
represents the paramount purpose of state school systems today.  The 
clearest indication of this intention lies in the language state legislatures 
used in authorizing the development of standards.  In ordering the 
creation of standards in 1995, California lawmakers issued a clear 
statement about the purpose those standards would serve: “[California 
shall] develop and adopt a set of statewide academically rigorous 
content standards and performance standards in all major subject areas 
to serve as the basis for . . . the California education system as a whole.”166 
The California legislature did not stop there.  Once the standards 
were promulgated, lawmakers proceeded to tie educational program 
after program to the standards, further demonstrating that the standards 
are the overarching purpose of the entire system.  California ordered its 
textbooks and instructional materials, accountability, standardized tests, 
graduation requirements, and teacher credentialing all to be tied to its 
standards.167 
The state’s defense that the common purpose driving its school 
systems is something other than the standards is thus severely undercut 
 
165. See supra Part III.B. 
166. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60602(a)(2) (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
167. See id. § 60422(a) (connecting textbooks and instructional materials to state 
standards);  id. §§ 60602(a)(2),  60605(a)(1)(A) (linking school accountability to standards);  § 
60640(f)(3)(A) (tying standardized testing to standards); id. § 60850 (tying the state’s high 
school exit examination to state achievement standards); and id. § 44259(b)(3) (West 2006) 
(linking teacher certification requirements to state standards). 
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by a litany of legislative enactments that demonstrate how the standards 
are, both in law and practice, the common purpose of its school systems.  
And while the state may suggest that the standards are meant to serve 
only an aspirational function, such an argument is of no moment 
because an aspirational purpose for a school system is a common 
purpose nonetheless.168 
C.  State School Finance Formulas are Neither Rationally nor Actually 
Designed to Enable Students to Meet State Academic Standards 
Once it is established that California has a constitutional duty to 
provide a system of common schools composed of programs and policies 
rationally and actually designed to effectuate their academic content 
standards, the last task for plaintiffs is to show that the State’s school 
funding system stands in violation of this duty.  Here, the way in which 
school funding is distributed in California speaks for itself.  Unlike its 
policies concerning curriculum, accountability, testing, textbooks, 
teacher certification, and graduation requirements, which are all set in 
relation to state standards, California uses school finance formulas that 
are based on a hodgepodge of factors including the disjunctive three-
part test in Proposition 98: revenue limits, categorical programs, and 
political expediency in general.169  Thus, the one factor that the state 
must consider to meet its duty to provide a system of common schools is 
one it simply does not account for in disbursing state school aid: the 
actual cost of providing the state’s children with an education that would 
satisfy statewide academic standards.  Underscoring the irrationality of 
the system, a 2007 costing-out study found that California spent 40% 
less in statewide school funding than the amount that would be 
necessary to meet the state’s own standards.170  Moreover, the basic 
structure of California’s school finance was enacted prior to state 
standards.171  As a result, the funding scheme cannot meet the state’s 
system duty to be actually calculated for the common purpose of 
 
168. To be sure, nothing in the broken system claim forecloses a state from lowering or 
watering down standards as a response to a court order, thereby lowering its funding duty.  
Ultimately, however, political safeguards are likely to prevent politicians from lowering their 
standards beneath a level that is acceptable to the voting public. 
169. See Kirst, supra note 12. 
170. JON SONSTELIE, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., ALIGNING SCHOOL FINANCE WITH 
ACADEMIC STANDARDS: A WEIGHTED-STUDENT FORMULA BASED ON A SURVEY OF 
PRACTITIONERS, at iii (2007). 
171. See Kirst, supra note 12. 
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achieving of state standards.172 
So strong is the evidence on these counts, in fact, that the state’s best 
counter-argument may be to concede the irrational design of its funding 
scheme vis-à-vis the standards and to argue instead that the duty to 
create a system of common schools does not give rise to a duty to align 
every state educational program with state standards.  Under this 
argument, the state could contend that it has discharged its system duty 
by setting standards as the common purpose for its system and by 
aligning only core instructional and accountability programs with those 
standards.  After all, the state will argue, it cannot be the case that every 
state law concerning public schools must align with the standards.  And 
if laws concerning fuel-efficient drivers’ education, agricultural 
education, and staff fingerprinting requirements173 need not align with 
the standards, then likewise, neither should school funding. 
This counter-argument is unlikely to prevail for two reasons.  First, a 
court could simply disagree and decide that the system duty does in fact 
require every state educational program to be designed to rationally 
serve the standards.  Second, a court could draw a line between core 
state policies and programs and trivial ones, requiring only those state 
policies that have a substantial impact on the achievement of state 
standards, such as school funding, to be aligned to those standards.  
Under either rationale, the state’s duty to create a system of common 
schools would extend to school finance, requiring the state to align its 
funding structure to its standards. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Like any untested legal theory, the cause of action I have proposed 
here, rooted in a state’s constitutional duty to provide a system of 
common schools, is not without potential pitfalls and challenges.  I have 
attempted to address some of the major challenges by using California 
case law and statutes to fashion a case study above, although different 
challenges may well exist in other jurisdictions. 
For plaintiffs who raise a broken system cause of action, however, 
there may be substantial benefits to taking on these challenges.  First 
off, in the fourteen states where previous school finance lawsuits raised 
 
172. See supra Part III.A. 
173. Cal. Educ. Code § 51854 (West 2006) (fuel efficient driver education law); id. § 8982 
(agricultural education program); id. § 10911.5 (fingerprinting of employees having contact 
with minors). 
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under equity and adequacy grounds have failed,174 but where the state 
constitutions obligate the state to provide a system of public schools, the 
ability to challenge the state’s school funding program under a new 
theory of liability can provide advocates with a sorely needed tool to 
advance the plight of disadvantaged school children.  Second, in the 
states where adequacy and equity litigation has already resulted in 
plaintiffs’ liability decisions, the ability to plead a broken system cause 
of action can prove useful to the extent that the remedy from such a 
claim—the alignment of state school aid with the cost of meeting state 
standards—would exceed the existing remedies from the prior suits.  As 
Part II.B demonstrated above, thirteen of the fourteen states analyzed 
that experienced a pro-plaintiff liability decision still spend less on K–12 
education than would be necessary to provide their children with the 
quality of education that state lawmakers themselves have described as 
essential to civic, economic, and social success in the twenty-first 
century.  It is precisely this gap that the broken system theory of school 
finance litigation aims to fill. 
Third, the potential utility of the broken system cause of action is 
strengthened inasmuch as it represents a plausible legal theory.  To be 
sure, only time will tell just how persuasive the courts find the theory to 
be, and perhaps the fate of Robles-Wong will provide an early 
indication.  But to the extent the theory is firmly grounded in the 
ordinary meaning of the term system present in the text of state 
constitutions, and to the extent that the few courts to consider the 
meaning of system have shown a willingness to construe the term in a 
manner that would grant plaintiffs relief, perhaps there is reason for 
advocates to be optimistic. 
Lastly, where one of the primary factors that has motivated some 
courts to reject adequacy and equity claims is the concern that the task 
of defining educational adequacy or equity is a non-justiciable, political 
question for which legislatures, not courts, are best suited,175 the broken 
system cause of action leaves solely to the legislature the responsibility 
of defining the quality of education that a state should provide.  The 
theory neither requires nor allows the court to make initial policy 
determinations as to the qualitative level of education that a state must 
 
174. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and 
Virginia.  See supra note 99 (explaining eleven states have declined to reach the merits of 
challenges based on adequacy grounds). 
175. See EDUCATION ADEQUACY LIABILITY DECISIONS, supra note 50. 
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provide or the kind of equity that is necessary to satisfy the equal 
protection clause. 
Thus, rather than requiring a court to consider complex evidence of 
comparative educational need and spending across districts as in equity 
litigation, or to weigh competing definitions of educational adequacy 
that are unmoored from the text of actual state constitutional provisions 
as in adequacy litigation, the work that the broken system cause of 
action asks courts to do is far simpler.  A judge deciding the broken 
system claim needs only to construe the meaning of the term system and 
whether it means what plaintiffs assert it means in line with the rational–
actual definition described above.176  Once the meaning of system is 
decided, a judge’s remaining task is simply to ensure that whatever 
educational programs and policies the legislature chooses to adopt are 
rationally and actually designed to serve whatever common standards 
the state chooses for its schools.  In performing this role, the court is 
asked to apply an eminently familiar and manageable judicial standard: 
a version of rationality review177 where a legislature’s actions are 
presumed constitutional so long as its policies are both reasonably 
calculated to serve state content standards and actually designed with 
that purpose in mind. 
Under this standard, a court’s task may be straightforward in 
comparison to the protracted and controversial work done by courts in 
school finance lawsuits past: only a policy that is either completely 
unjustifiable in view of the state’s standards or that was not in fact 
designed to serve the standards will be struck down.  By and large, 
school finance formulas used in states throughout the nation fail on both 
counts, rendering the broken system argument a potentially powerful 
tool in the hands of advocates who seek a day where academic standards 
are more than a pipedream for the nation’s least fortunate children. 
 
 
176. As I have shown above, this is a plausible result especially given that courts in 
Wyoming, New York, and California have already interpreted the term system to reach a 
similar conclusion.  See supra Parts III.A–B. 
177. The rationality review employed in the broken system claim differs from traditional 
rationality review in two key respects.  Instead of asking whether the challenged state policy 
is rationally related to any legitimate state end, the broken system claim would first require 
both a rational and actual relationship.  Second, it would prevent the state from asserting any 
end. A court would look for a relationship between the challenged policy and only the actual 
end that the state has set for its schools, which I have argued above is the achievement of 
academic content standards. 
